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It is natural enough that UNCTAD should be concerned about the
international transfer of technology, for the problems that are dis-
cussed under this heading are typically about the relations between
large firms possessing technological 'quasi-monopolies' (as well as
other kinds of monopolistic advantage) and under-developed countries.
There is a contradiction between the needs for new production tech-
nologies in under-developed countries (though the precise nature of
these 'needs' could do with closer examination) and the terms and
conditions on which technology is supplied. The technologies might
be needed for 'development' in some general sense, but it often
turns out that they can only be got on terms which themselves create
obstacles to development. This type of problem in international eco-
nomic relations is precisely what UNCTAD is about.
UNCTAD's involvement is understandable from another point of
view. Much of the recent concern about 'transfer of technology' has
been part of a wider concern about the limitations of the kind of
import-substituting industrialisation which UNCTAD itself supported
some years ago. This does not mean that the problems associated with
technological monopolies are only found in import-substituting eco
nomies. It is simply that one's attention is naturally drawn to
technology transfer problems as soon as one poses the question:
"What are the developmental implications of import-substitution pol-
icies when the import-substituting is done by foreign firms, or on
the basis of foreign technologies?". These are questions that were
not asked in the Prebisch era, although with the advantages of hind-
sight it is easy to see that they are significant questions to ask
about Prebisch-type policies. And it is highly appropriate for this
reason too, that they should be raised in UNCTAD.
UNCTAD III passed a resolution on the transfer of technology
LResolution 39 (III)], which is the nearest UNCTAD has got to an
international agreement on the importance and relevance of the
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subject. The resolution has a rather special place in the annals of
Santiago, because it passed the plenary discussion without objection
(though we think there were some stated reservations). It has been
widely interpreted as the success of UNCTAD III - one of the few
things on which there was agreement.
On the face of it, there is something of a puzzle here: Flow is
it that the conference could agree on this question - which is at
least as controversial and fundamental as many of the things On which
agreement was impossible? Is it simply that the resolution contains
nothing of significance, or is there a real agreement on real issues?
One cannot answer these questions without knowing a little of
the prior history of transfer of technology in UNCTAD. In all proba-
bility, it started quite a long while back - possibly in internal
discussions in the Secretariat, or between the Secretariat and the
UNCTAD delegations. There must have been a period of labyrinthine
inter-agency debate. But we can take as given the flow of memoranda
and the artful manoeuvre that inevitably precedes any 'initiative'
in the UN system. The first public sign that something was happening
was a decision by the Trade & Development Board of UNCTAD - suitably
buttressed by referençes to a small mountain of inter-agency commu-
nications, memoranda and the like - that there should be something
called an Intergovernmental Group on Transfer of Technology. This
group (on which 45 governments are represented) is to prepare a pro-
gramme of work for UNCTAD; it has to identify obstacles and problems
in the transfer of technology and consider possibilities for the
development of international and national action. An UNCTAD Inter-
governmental Group (I.G.G.) is not a permanent committee; it has a
specified life, after which it might be turned into a committee or
disbanded.
This particular I.G.G. is probably a compromise. The developing
countries were insistent that they wanted something done about the
transfer of technology and the issue could not be shelved. Group B
(the advanced market economies) were not particularly anxious to
make much of the issues, and anyway, are generally very anxious to
restrict the growth of the international secretariats. The I.C.C. is
a half-way house between a permanent committee and doing nothing.
Its very existence is subject to review - and it is not empowered to
start international negotiation)- only to propose areas where there
might be some 'action. At the same time, the Intergovernmental
Group makes the working decisions on the orientation of effort with-
in UNCTAD, and on the conclusions and proposals that come out of the
secretariat programme.
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It was, however, something of an achievement to get the I.C.C.
set up at all. Even though it is the product of a compromise, it
has the power to discuss the 'transfer of technology' in a realistic
way. Until it was set up, most of the work in the UN on technology
transfer was about politically anodyne (though practically import-
aqt) problems like finding more 'appropriate' technologies for the
developing countries. And discussions of the problem between the
governments of the advanced countries normally concluded that they
could be solved if only the developing countries would give adequate
incentives to foreign private direct investment, and to advanced
country enterprises that have technology to licence. The I.G.G. is
the first international forum which has the power to discuss the
thorny political and economic issues that arise when one faces rea-
lities: e.g. that 'technology' is very often a form of industrial
property, which confers monopolistic advantages on the firms which
have it; and that the patent system is a support for the private
'ownership' of knowledge about production. Obviously there is no
consensus about the importance of these realities. Some advanced
country governments argue that the whole question has been vastly
exaggerated. But it is a considerable achievement to have generated
an international debate on issues which until a short time ago were
mainly discussed in the underground economic literature.
UNCTAD had equipped itself with the Intergovernmental Group be-
fore Santiago; there was already an agreed programme and some work
on the problem within the Secretariat. Any assessment of the signi-
ficance of the Conference Resolution on Technology must. take account
of this. The real question about the resolution is whether or not it
is a real advance on what had anyway been achieved before the Conf e-
rence started.
There is something to be said for the claim that there were
some gains at Santiago. At least the Conference did not disband the
I.C.C. and in fact confirmed its mandate. This however is not much
of an achievement, since it would have been very difficult politi-
cally for any government to have voted against the existence of a
committee which already had an approved programme.
But the Conference resolution has apparently made some net ad-
ditions to UNCTAD's activities in this field. It explicitly encoura-
ges the developing countries to tackle questions like 'registration,
review and approval of agreements involving transfer of technology',
'negotiation of contracts' and assisting domestic enterprises in
finding alternative suppliers of technology. It recommends that de-
veloping countries should exchange information amongst themselves on
their experiences. All these points are directly relevant to the
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bargaining position of developing countries vis-a-vis technology
suppliers.
There is also a recommendation that advanced countries should
'facilitate an accelerated transfer of technology' in various ways,
mainly by providing forms of technical assistance and information
and by "endeavouring to provide possible incentives to their enter-
prises to facilitate an accelerated transfer of their patented and
unpatented technologies... on fair and reasonable terms." These
particular clauses about what developed countries should do are
ambiguous. The main emphasis is on getting more transfers to take
place, which is not necessarily desirable. It would be too easy for
the advanced countries to claim that policies they may have already
which create incentives for their companies to invest in developing
countries met these recommendations - though it is most unlikely
that this is what the developing countries have in mind, and it is
certain that these policies beg all the important questions about
technological monopoly ("fair and reasonable terms" notwithstand-
ing). There is however one recommendation to the advanced countries
which is much more to the point, namely, that they should "partici-
pate actively in the identification of restrictive business practi-
ces affecting the transfer of technology.. .". Of course, it is a
long way from an UNCTAD recommendation to actual action and there is
no guarantee here that advanced countries will co-operate actively
with developing countries on restrictive practices - but it is
something to have got the recommendation included.
The recommendations to the Secretariat go a little beyond the
I.C.C. mandate in two further respects. First UNCTAD is now allowed
to give technical assistance to developing countries on the transfer
of technology (there will be U.N.D,P. funds for this) and to provide
training for personnel from these countries. Second, there is a spe-
cific request that the international patent system should be review-
ed. Both of these are distinct advances for the Secretariat program-
me not simply because they increase its size and area of responsibi-
lity (which is not necessarily a good thing), but because they bring
the secretariat into much more immediate contact with the realities
in the developing countries themselves.
Clearly there were some advances from the position that UNCTAD
had reached when it set up the I.G.G. They were however small advan-
ces; there is still no real agreement between Group B and the '77'
that this is an issue for negotiation. More precisely, it is in the
interest of most Group B countries to avoid international debate on
these issues - and UNCTAD III failed to find the arguments to force
them into negotiation. The recommendation on restrictive practices
gets near the mark, but it is only a recommendation; there is no
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commitment to do anything. Indeed, from some points of view the ad-
vance has been miniscule. Some advanced country representatives
apparently brought out the old chestnut that technology transfer is
done by private companies, and their governments do not interfere
with free enterprise. This is now an ancient line of defence: there
is no claim that the 'invisible hand' is working to the advantage
of everyone - including the developing countries - only an assertion
that nothing can be done about the matter (presumably even if it
turns out to be harming the developing countries). It is a measure
of the slowness with which the discussion is unfolding that people
cn make this kind of argument without being laughed out of the
committee room.
In some places, because of the influence of Group B countries,
the resolution is quite strongly influenced by the platitude that
the more foreign investment the developing countries can get, the
better (for whom?). This, also, is a small step backward from the
more realistic and intellectually tenable position that has grown up
in the discussions of the I.G.G. As far as this part is concerned,
the resolution is rescued from triviality (but only just), by the
piece on restrictive practices
There was no advance on the question of the I.G.G.: Will it
continue to have an existence after its first report to the Trade &
Development Board? Will 'transfer of technology' become a question
of comparable importance to 'aid & trade' in the UNCTAD system? Not
only are these still unanswered questions, but there is still doubt
about how the decisions on them will be taken. Will other agencies
have a role in a review of the work of the I.G.G., or will it be
done by UNCTAD alone? There is still a póssibility that secretariat
rivals in other agencies (and there are many), together with the
'opposition' delegates (mainly in Group B) could combine to quash
the whole thing when the I.G.G. mandate expires. UNCTAD III did no-
thing to avert the danger.
But the Resolution is limited in a more important way. Whilst
the future of the I.C.C. is an undecided matter, the fact remains
that it is the effective arbiter of what goes into the secretariat
programme of work and of the degree of priority that attaches to any
particular part. It may be politically difficult for the I.G.G. to
ignore a Conference recommendation; it is nevertheless possible to
diminish the effect of any particular proposal by putting restric-
tions on the availability of resources to carry it out. One does not
really know what significance to attach to the limited gains that
were made at Santiago, until one has some idea of whether or not the
Secretariat will get the money and the people it needs to make a
proper job. And since the UN as a whole is suffering from a severe
shortage of funds, a delegation which wishes to restrict the activi-
ties of the secretariat in any particular field, can usually find
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strong budgetary arguments to support its case. It can often rely on
support from within the UN system - because the various agencies in
the 'UN family' bicker about resources at the best of tines - and
fight like hell at times when the budget is restricted.
The reasons why it was possible for UNCTAD III to agree to the
resolution are not difficult to comprehend. Nearly all the proposals
of substance which the Conference was asked to underwrite had been
agreed before, at the time the I.G.G. was set up. And any delegation
which might have reservations about such additions as were made to
the mandate, knows that there is a 'fail-safe' device at hand. It
can effectively re-open the whole question in the I.G.G., where its
opposition can be conducted on the pragmatic grounds that there just
isn't any money to do the job.
A number of other factors probably contributed to the relative
ease in passing the resolution. For one thing UNCTAD delegations are
not yet acclimatized to this type of discussion. This probably makes
it easier to reach an agreed text without hours of Byzantine argum-
ent over commas and semi-colons. And those delegations which are
fully aware of the possible implications of the debate are content
to cross the bridges when they come to them. Many Group B countries
probably hope there will be no debate at all. The developing coun-
tries, correctly, would like a better supply of facts and empirical
analysis before they start in on it.
A second contributory factor was the relatively high degree of
unity amongst the '77'. This is an issue on which unity might be
relatively easy to achieve, and to what extent the discussion at
Santiago might have some salutary side-effects for the '77', if only
as a reminder of times past.
Finally, the Secretariat appears to have played an important
part. The UNCTAD secretariat dealing with these problems is enthusi-
astic and hard-working. It has the confidence of the vast majority
of delegations on either 'side' of the debate - and there is every
reason why it should. The secretariat was anxious to get a clear
mandate from UNCTAD III and worked hard to get it.
Thus the resolution passed easily, not because it is without
significance, but because most of what it contained had been dis-
cussed and agreed before. It was certainly worthwhile to have UNCTAD
III confirm the mandate of the I.G.G., but hardly surprising that it
could do little more. The programme of analysis which the I.G.G.
started in 1970/71 is still only a programme; there are few substan-
tive proposals for action as yet. The real political debate cannot
start until there are proposals. In the circumstances representatives
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of the developing countries at UNCTAD III were content to confirm
the principle that UNCTAD should busy itself with the problems -
because there was really little else they could do. The advanced
countries could not force a retreat from the Intergovernmental Group
even if they had wanted to, so that they were content with a few
tactical adjustments to the terms of the resolution. Anyway, the
really important decisions will be made in the I.C.C. Meanwhile, the
Secretariat is collecting empirical evidence, in preparation for a
real debate. But even then, of course, there will be the long road
from international argy-bargy to action. In the meantime the devel-
oping countries would be well advised to take action themselves,
particularly by comparing flotes on the experiences they have had in
negotiating with foreign enterprise. OPEC has shown that collective
action of this kind is an effective way to strengthen one's bargain-
ing position - and that is what it is all about.
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